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Abstract
Expected utility functions are limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, while
non-expected utility functions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional)
risk aversion. We extend the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of
conditional dependent risk aversion. We show that first-order conditional dependent risk
aversion is consistent with the framework of the expected utility hypothesis. We relate our
results to risk diversification, provide insights into their application in economic and finance
examples, and discuss their relation with the stock market participation puzzle.
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1 Introduction
The concepts of second-order and first-order risk aversion were coined by Segal and Spivak
(1990). For an actuarially fair random variable ε˜, second-order risk aversion means that the risk
premium the agent is willing to pay to avoid kε˜ is proportional to k2 as k → 0. Under first-order
risk aversion, the risk premium is proportional to k. Loomes and Segal (1994) extend this notion
to preferences about uninsured events, such as independent additive background risks. They
introduce the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion. Define y˜ as an independent additive
risk. The conditional risk premium is the amount of money the decision maker is willing to
pay to avoid ε˜ in the presence of y˜. The preference relation satisfies first-order conditional risk
aversion if the risk premium the agent is willing to pay to avoid kε˜ is proportional to k as k → 0.
It satisfies second-order conditional risk aversion if the risk premium is proportional to k2.
To the best of our knowledge, utility functions in the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility class exhibit only second-order conditional risk aversion, while non-expected utility func-
tions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aversion1. First-order (con-
ditional) risk aversion implies that small risks matter. Because expected utility theory is limited
to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, it cannot take into account many real world results.
Epstein and Zin (1990) find that first-order risk aversion can help resolve the equity premium
puzzle. Barberis et al. (2006) show that utility functions that combine first-order risk aversion
with narrow framing can easily address the stock market participation puzzle. Schlesinger (1997)
uses first-order risk aversion to explain why full insurance coverage may be optimal even when
there is a positive premium loading. Further applications of first-order risk aversion appear
in Schmidt (1999), Barberis et al. (2001), and Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009), among
others.
In this paper, we extend the concepts of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of
conditional dependent risk aversion, for which ε˜ and the background risk y˜ are dependent and y˜
may enter the agent’s utility function arbitrarily. We investigate whether first-order conditional
dependent risk aversion appears in the framework of the expected utility hypothesis; the general
answer to this question is positive with some weak restrictions.
We propose conditions on the stochastic structure between ε˜ and y˜ that guarantee first-order
conditional dependent risk aversion for expected utility agents with a certain type of risk prefer-
1See Eeckhoudt et al. (2005), Chapter 13, for more discussion.
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ence, i.e., with correlation aversion. Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007) provide an economic
interpretation of correlation aversion: a higher level of the background variable mitigates the
detrimental effect of a reduction in wealth. It turns out that the concept of expectation depen-
dence, proposed by Wright (1987), is the key element to such a stochastic structure. Further, the
more information that we have about the sign of higher cross derivatives of the utility function,2
the weaker the dependence conditions on distribution we need. These weaker dependence condi-
tions, which demonstrate the applicability of a weak version of expectation dependence (called
N th-order expectation dependence (Li, 2011)), induce weaker dependence conditions between ε˜
and y˜ to guarantee first-order conditional dependent risk aversion.
Risk premium is an important concept in economics and finance. Intuition suggests that
the risk premium for a diversified risk should relate to the number of trials n. We investigate
a correlation-averse risk premium for a naive diversified risk in the presence of a dependent
background risk. The naive diversified risk is defined as one in which a fraction 1n of wealth is
allocated to each of the n risks. In the absence of a dependent background risk, the population
mean value of the naive diversified risk approximates the expected value. The Law of Large
Numbers states that the risk premium converges to zero when n is large. This is often called
the benefit of diversification. Given that in real life, an agent can diversify wealth only on a
limited number of risks, a natural question is how small is the risk premium in the presence of
a dependent background risk? In other words, what is the convergence rate or approximation
error? Our results show that the convergence rate is at the order of 1
n2
in the presence of an
independent background risk compared with 1n in the presence of a dependent background risk.
This difference is a quantitative statement on diversification which provides benefit information
on how background risk affects the risk premium of a naively diversified risk. This result
also provides additional insights into previous results on insurance supply, public investment
decisions, naive diversified portfolio model, bank lending, and the lottery business in the presence
of a dependent background risk.
One puzzle for economic theory is the non-participation in the stock market by households
with significant financial wealth. Previous studies explain non-participation by the correlation
between stock market returns and background risk (Heaton and Lucas, 1997, 2000; Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2002; and Curcuru et al. 2005). Other contributions show that first-order risk
2Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) provide a context-free interpretation for the sign of higher cross-derivatives of the
utility function.
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aversion could provide an additional explanation (see Barberis et al., 2006, for a longer discus-
sion). Our contribution offers a new explanation for the traditional expected utility framework
by introducing first-order risk aversion along with a stronger definition of dependence between
stock market risk and background risk exposure than covariance.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 discusses the concept
of orders of conditional risk aversion. Section 4 investigates the orders of conditional dependent
risk aversion. Section 5 proposes some weaker dependence conditions, and Section 6 applies the
results to different economic and financial examples. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider an agent whose preference for a random wealth, w˜, and a random outcome, y˜, can
be represented by a bivariate expected utility function. Let u(w, y) be the utility function, and
let u1(w, y) denote ∂u∂w and u2(w, y) denote
∂u
∂y , and follow the same subscript convention for
higher derivatives u11(w, y) and u12(w, y) and so on. We assume that all partial derivatives
required for any definition exist. We make the standard assumption that u1 > 0.
Let us assume that z˜ = kε˜ in the absence of a background risk. Parameter k can be
interpreted as the size of the risk. One way to measure an agent’s degree of risk aversion for
z˜ is to ask her how much she is ready to pay to get rid of z˜. The answer to this question
will be referred to as the risk premium pi(k) associated with that risk. For an agent with
utility function u, Ey˜, and non-random initial wealth w, the risk premium pi(k) must satisfy the
following condition:
u(w + Ekε˜− pi(k), Ey˜) = Eu(w + kε˜, Ey˜). (1)
Segal and Spivak (1990) give the following definitions of first and second-order risk aversion:
Definition 2.1 (Segal and Spivak, 1990) The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is of first order
if for every ε˜ with Eε˜ = 0, pi′(0) 6= 0.
Definition 2.2 (Segal and Spivak, 1990) The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is of second
order if for every ε˜ with Eε˜ = 0, pi′(0) = 0 but pi′′(0) 6= 0.
They provide the following results linking properties of a utility function to its order of risk
aversion given the level of wealth w0:
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(a) If a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u is not differentiable at w0 but
has well-defined and distinct left and right derivatives at w0, then the agent exhibits first-order
risk aversion at w0.
(b) If a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u is twice differentiable at w0
with u11 6= 0, then the agent exhibits second-order risk aversion at w0.
Segal and Spivak (1997) point out that if the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is
increasing, then it must be differentiable almost everywhere, and one may convincingly argue
that non-differentiability is seldom observed in the expected utility model. Alternatively, concave
utility functions must have a limited number of kink points. Therefore, this model cannot take
first-order risk aversion into account.
3 Order of conditional risk aversion
Loomes and Segal (1994) introduced the order of conditional risk aversion by examining the
characteristic of pi(k) in the presence of independent uninsured risks. For an agent with utility
function u and initial wealth w, the conditional risk premium pic(k) must satisfy the following
condition:
Eu(w + Ekε˜− pic(k), y˜) = Eu(w + kε˜, y˜). (2)
where ε˜ and y˜ are independent.
Definition 3.1 (Loomes and Segal, 1994) The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is first-order
conditional risk aversion if for every ε˜ with Eε˜ = 0, pi′c(0) 6= 0.
Definition 3.2 (Loomes and Segal, 1994) The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is second-order
conditional risk aversion if for every ε˜ with Eε˜ = 0, pi′c(0) = 0 but pi′′c (0) 6= 0.
It is obvious that the definitions of first- and second-order conditional risk aversion are more
general than the definitions of first- and second-order risk aversion
We can extend the above definitions to the case Eε˜ 6= 0. Since u is differentiable, fully
differentiating (2) with respect to k yields
E{[Eε˜− pi′c(k)]u1(w + Ekε˜− pic(k), y˜)} = E[ε˜u1(w + kε˜, y˜)]. (3)
Since ε˜ and y˜ are independent,
pi′c(0) =
Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜)− E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)]
Eu1(w, y˜)
= 0. (4)
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Therefore, not only does pic(k) approach zero as k approaches zero, but also pi′c(0) = 0. This
implies that at the margin, accepting a small zero-mean risk has no effect on the welfare of
risk-averse agents. This is an important property of expected-utility theory: “in the small”, the
expected-utility maximizers are risk-neutral.
Using a Taylor expansion of pic around k = 0, we obtain that
pic(k) = pic(0) + pi′c(0)k +O(k
2) = O(k2). (5)
This result is the Arrow-Pratt approximation, which states that the conditional risk premium
is approximately proportional to the square of the size of the risk.
Within the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility model, if the random outcome and
the background risk are independent, then second-order conditional risk aversion relies on the
assumption that the utility function is differentiable. Hence, with an independent background
risk, utility functions in the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility class can generically
exhibit only second-order conditional risk aversion and cannot explain the rejection of a small,
independent, and actuarially favorable gamble.
4 Order of conditional dependent risk aversion
We now introduce the concept of order of conditional dependent risk aversion. For an agent
with utility function u and initial wealth w, the conditional dependent risk premium, picd(k),
must satisfy the following condition:
Eu(w +Ekε˜− picd(k), y˜) = Eu(w + kε˜, y˜). (6)
where ε˜ and y˜ are not necessarily independent.3
Definition 4.1 The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is first-order conditional dependent risk
aversion if for every ε˜, picd(k)− pic(k) = O(k).
Definition 4.2 The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is second-order conditional dependent
risk aversion if for every ε˜, picd(k)− pic(k) = O(k2).
3In the statistical literature, the sequence bk is at most of order k
λ, denoted as bk = O(k
λ), if for some finite
real number ∆ > 0, there exists a finite integer K such that for all k > K, |kλbk| < ∆ (see White 2000, p16).
5
picd(k) − pic(k) measures how dependence between risks affects risk premium. Second-order
conditional dependent risk aversion implies that, in the presence of a dependent background risk,
small risk has no effect on risk premium, while first-order conditional dependent risk aversion
implies that, in the presence of a dependent background risk, small risk affects risk premium.
We denote by F (ε, y) and f(ε, y) the joint distribution and density functions of (ε˜, y˜), re-
spectively. Fε(ε) and Fy(y) are the marginal distributions.
Wright (1987) introduced the concept of expectation dependence in the economics literature.
In the following definition, we use a weaker definition of expectation dependence (ED(y)).
Definition 4.3 If
ED(y) = [Eε˜− E(ε˜|y˜ ≤ y)] ≥ 0 for all y, (7)
and there is at least some y0 for which a strong inequality holds,
then ε˜ is positive expectation dependent on y˜. Similarly, ε˜ is negative expectation dependent on
y˜ if (7) holds with the inequality sign reversed. The family of all distributions F satisfying (7)
will be denoted by H1 and the family of all negative expectation dependent distributions will be
denoted by I1.
Wright (1987, p115) interprets negative first-degree expectation dependence as follows: “when
we discover y˜ is small, in the precise sense that we are given the truncation y˜ ≤ y, our expectation
of ε˜ is revised upward.” Definition 4.3 is useful for deriving an explicit value of picd(k).
Lemma 4.4
picd(k) = −k
∫∞
−∞ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
+O(k2). (8)
Proof See Appendix.
Lemma 4.4 shows the general condition for first-order risk aversion. The condition involves two
important concepts u12, the cross-derivative of the utility function, and ED(y), the expectation
dependence between two risks. The sign of u12 indicates how this first element acts on utility u.
Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) provide a context-free interpretation of the sign of u12. They show that
u12 < 0 is necessary and sufficient for “correlation aversion,” meaning that a higher level of the
background variable mitigates the detrimental effect of a reduction in wealth. The condition
also captures the welfare interaction between the two risks. The sign of expectation dependence
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indicates whether the movements on background risk tend to reinforce the movements on wealth
(positive expectation dependence) or to counteract them (negative expectation dependence).
Lemma (4.4) allows a quantitative treatment of the direction and size of the effect of expectation
dependence on first order risk aversion. To clarify this, consider the following cases: (1) Assume
the agent is correlation neutral (u12 = 0) or the background risk is independent (ED(y) = 0),
then the agent’s attitude towards risk is second-order conditional dependent risk aversion; (2)
Assume u12 < 0 and ED(y) > 0 (ED(y) < 0), then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first-
order conditional dependent risk aversion and her marginal risk premium for a small risk is
positive (negative) (i.e., limk→0+ pi′cd(k) > (<)0).
From Lemma (4.4) and Equation (5), we obtain
Proposition 4.5 (i) If ε˜ is positive expectation dependent on y˜ and u12 < 0, then the agent’s
attitude towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) − pic(k) =
|O(k)|;
(ii) If ε˜ is negative expectation dependent on y˜ and u12 > 0, then the agent’s attitude towards
risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = |O(k)|;
(iii) If ε˜ is positive expectation dependent on y˜ and u12 > 0, then the agent’s attitude towards
risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = −|O(k)|;
(iv) If ε˜ is negative expectation dependent on y˜ and u12 < 0, then the agent’s attitude towards
risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = −|O(k)|.
We consider two examples to illustrate Proposition 4.5.
Example 1. Consider the additive background risk case u(x, y) = U(x+ y). Here x may be
the random wealth of an agent and y may be a random income risk which cannot be insured.
Since u12 < 0⇔ U ′′ < 0, part (i) and (iv) of Proposition 4.5 imply that if the agent is risk averse
and ε˜ is positive (negative) expectation dependent on the background risk y˜, then the agent’s
attitude towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) > (<)pic(k).
Example 2. Consider the multiplicative background risk case u(x, y) = U(xy). Here x may
be the random wealth of an agent and y may be a random interest rate risk which cannot be
hedged. Since u12 < 0 ⇔ −xyU
′′(xy)
U ′(xy) > 1 (relative risk aversion greater than 1), Proposition
4.5 implies that (i) if −xyU ′′(xy)U ′(xy) > 1 and ε˜ is positive (negative) expectation dependent on the
background risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first-order conditional dependent
risk aversion and picd(k) > (<)pic(k); (ii) if −xyU
′′(xy)
U ′(xy) < 1 and ε˜ is positive (negative) expec-
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tation dependent on the background risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first-order
conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) < (>)pic(k).
5 First-order conditional dependent risk aversion and N th-order
expectation dependent background risk
Li (2011) considers the following weaker dependence definition. Suppose y˜ ∈ [c, d], where c and d
are finite. Rewriting 1thED(x˜|y) = FED(x˜|y), 2thED(x˜|y) = SED(x˜|y) = ∫ yc FED(x˜|t)Fy(t)dt,
and repeating integrals defined by
N thED(x˜|y) =
∫ y
c
(N − 1)thED(x˜|t)dt, for N ≥ 3, (9)
we obtain:
Definition 5.1 (Li 2011) If mthED(x˜|d) ≥ 0, for m = 2, ..., N − 1 and
N thED(x˜|y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [c, d], (10)
then x˜ is positive N th-order expectation dependent (NED) on y˜. The family of all distributions F
satisfying (10) will be denoted by HN . Similarly, x˜ is negative N th-order expectation dependent
on y˜ if (10) holds with the inequality sign reversed, and the family of all negative N th-order
expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by IN .
From this definition, we know that HN ⊃ HN−1 and IN ⊃ IN−1. In the following lemma, we
obtain the risk premium in the presence of an N th-order expectation dependent background
risk.
Lemma 5.2
picd(k) (11)
= −k
∑N
m=2(−1)mu12(m−1)(w, d)mthED(x˜|d) +
∫ d
c (−1)N+1u12(N)(w, y)N thED(x˜|y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
+O(k2).
Proof See Appendix.
From Lemma (5.2) and Equation (5), we obtain
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Proposition 5.3 (i) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then the
agent’s attitude towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) −
pic(k) = |O(k)|;
(ii) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≥ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then the agent’s attitude
towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = |O(k)|;
(iii) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≥ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then the agent’s attitude
towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = −|O(k)|;
(iv) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then the agent’s attitude
towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = −|O(k)|.
Eeckhoudt et al. (2007, p120) also provide an intuitive interpretation for the meaning of the
sign of the higher order cross-derivatives of utility function, u12(k) . For example, u122 > 0 is a
necessary and sufficient condition for “cross-prudence in wealth,” meaning that higher wealth
reduces the detrimental effect of the background risk. We consider two examples to illustrate
Proposition 5.3.
Example 3. Consider the additive background risk case u(x, y) = U(x + y). Since
(−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 ⇔ (−1)mU (m) ≤ 0, parts (i) and (iv) of Proposition 5.3 imply that if
the agent is kth degree risk averse (See Ekern, 1980 and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2006 for
more discussions of kth-degree risk aversion.) for m = 1, 2, ..., N +1 and ε˜ is positive (negative)
Nth expectation dependent on the background risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards risk is
first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) > (<)pic(k).
Example 4. Consider the multiplicative background risk case u(x, y) = U(xy). Since
(−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0⇔ (−1)mxy
U (m+1)(xy)
U (m)(xy)
≥ m, for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1 (12)
(multiplicative risk apportionment of order m for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1)
(See Eeckhoudt et al., 2009, Wang and Li, 2010, and Chiu et al., 2010 for more discus-
sions of multiplicative risk apportionment of order m.) Proposition 5.3 implies that (i) if
(−1)mxyU(m+1)(xy)
U(m)(xy)
≥ m form = 1, 2, ..., N+1 and ε˜ is positive (negative) expectation dependent
on the background risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first-order conditional depen-
dent risk aversion and picd(k) > (<)pic(k); (ii) if (−1)mxyU
(m+1)(xy)
U(m)(xy)
≤ m for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1
and ε˜ is positive (negative) expectation dependent on the background risk y˜, then the agent’s
attitude towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) < (>)pic(k).
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6 Applications: the importance of background risk in risk di-
versification and portfolio choice
In this section, we illustrate the applicability of our results, specifically, how they can be used
to gain additional insight into risk diversification in the presence of a dependent background
risk. We also show how our framework extends the understanding of insurance supply, public
investment decisions, naive diversified portfolio model, stock market participation puzzle, bank
lending, and the lottery business in the presence of a dependent background risk.
6.1 Background risk and risk diversification
Common wisdom suggests that diversification is a good way to reduce risk. Consider a set of n
lotteries whose net gains are characterized by ε˜1, ε˜2,...,ε˜n which are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed. Define the sample mean ε˜ = 1n
∑n
i=1 ε˜i then, when w is not random,
Eu(w + Eε˜− pic( 1
n
), y˜) = Eu(w + ε˜, y˜), where ε˜ and y˜ are independent, (13)
and
Eu(w+Eε˜−picd( 1
n
), y˜) = Eu(w+ ε˜, y˜), where ε˜ and y˜ are not necessary independent. (14)
From (5), we know that pic( 1n) = O(
1
n2
). When n→∞, pic( 1n)→ 0 because diversification is an
efficient way to reduce risk. With an independent background risk, diversification can eliminate
idiosyncratic risk at the rate of 1
n2
and the agent is second-order risk averse. This is the well
known benefit of diversification. However, with a dependent background risk, it is not clear that
the benefit of diversification holds for a correlation-averse agent.
From Proposition 5.3 and equation (5), we obtain:
Proposition 6.1 (i) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then
picd( 1n) = |O( 1n)|;
(ii) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≥ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then picd( 1n) = |O( 1n)|;
(iii) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≥ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then picd( 1n) = −|O( 1n)|;
(iv) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then picd( 1n) = −|O( 1n)|.
Proposition 6.1 signs the effect of dependent background risk on the benefits of diversification:
if ε˜ and y˜ are positive (negative) expectation dependent and the agent is correlation-averse,
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then picd( 1n) will be greater (less) than zero. Proposition 6.1 also shows that in the presence
of an expectation dependent background risk, diversification can eliminate idiosyncratic risk
(picd( 1n) → 0, as n → ∞). Therefore, for correlation-averse agents, the benefit of diversification
still holds. However, the convergence rate is 1n rather than
1
n2
which implies that if we use the
wrong convergence rate to approximate picd( 1n), then the error will be large in the presence of
an expectation dependent background risk.
6.2 Public investment decisions
Arrow and Lind (1970) investigate the implications of uncertainty for public investment deci-
sions. They consider the case where all individuals have the same preferences U , and their
disposable incomes are identically distributed random variables represented by A˜. Suppose that
the government undertakes an investment with returns represented by B˜, which are independent
of A˜. Let B¯ = EB˜ and X˜ = B˜− B¯. Consider a specific taxpayer and denote his fraction of this
investment by s with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Suppose that each taxpayer has the same tax rate and that
there are n taxpayers, then s = 1n . Arrow and Lind (1970) show that
EU(A˜+
B¯
n
+ r(n)) = EU(A˜+
B¯ + X˜
n
), (15)
where r(n) is the risk premium of the representative individual. They demonstrate that not only
does r(n) vanish when n → ∞, but so does the total of the risk premiums for all individuals:
nr(n) approaches zero as n rises. This result implies that the total cost of risk-bearing (nr(n))
goes to zero as the population of taxpayers increases and the expected value of net benefit (B¯)
closely approximates the correct measure of net benefits in terms of willingness to pay.
Proposition 6.1 allows us to investigate the cases where A˜ and B˜ are dependent. Since (15)
can be rewritten as
EU(A˜+
B¯
n
+ r(n)) = EU(A˜+
B˜
n
), (16)
from Proposition 6.1, we obtain:
Proposition 6.2 (i) If (B˜, A˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mU (m) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then r(n) =
−|O( 1n)|;
(ii) If (B˜, A˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mU (m) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then r(n) = |O( 1n)|.
Therefore, when A˜ and B˜ are expectation dependent, nr(n) cannot vanish as n increases. Propo-
sition 6.2 shows that if the return on the investment and the disposable incomes are positive
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(negative) expectation dependent and the society is risk-averse, then, as the population of tax-
payers increases, the total cost of risk-bearing will remain less (greater) than zero and the
expected value of net benefit (B¯) overestimates (underestimates) the correct measure of net
benefits in terms of willingness to pay.
6.3 Stock market participation puzzle
The stock market participation puzzle states that even though the stock market has a positive
mean return, a large proportion of the population does not hold any stock (Mankiw and Zeldes,
1991; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). This puzzle has various explanations. For example, Barberis
et al. (2006) show that utility functions that combine first-order risk aversion with narrow
framing can easily address the puzzle. Another approach examines whether nonstockholders
have background risks correlated with the stock market risks (Heaton and Lucas, 1997, 2000;
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). However, Heaton and Lucas (2000) find that stock market risks have
a correlation close to zero with other important risks, such as labor income risk, proprietary
income risk, and house price risk. Curcuru et al. (2005) question whether the correlation of the
stock market return with the background risk of nonstockholders is high enough to explain the
participation puzzle.
Our results offer a new explanation for the stock market participation puzzle by adding first-
order risk aversion to the standard expected utility framework and by proposing expectation
dependence, which is a stronger definition of dependence than covariance. We showed that for
expected utility preferences, it is the expectation dependence between the stock market risks
and background risks, rather than the covariance, that determines households’ risk premiums.
From the definition of expectation dependence, we know that positive (negative) correlated ran-
dom variables are not necessary positive (negative) expectation dependent. Here, we provide a
simple example of two random variables that are positive correlated but not positive expectation
dependent.
Example 5. Let x˜ be normally distributed with Ex˜ = µ > 0 and var(x˜) = σ2. Let y˜ = x˜2.
Since Ex˜2 = µ2 + σ2 and Ex˜3 = µ3 + 3µσ2, then
cov(x˜, y˜) = Ex˜y˜ − Ex˜Ey˜ (17)
= Ex˜3 − Ex˜Ex˜2
= µ3 + 3µσ2 − µ(µ2 + σ2) = 2µσ2 > 0.
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By definition,
ED(−
√
µ2 + σ2) = Ey˜ − E(y˜|x˜ ≤ −
√
µ2 + σ2) (18)
= Ex˜2 −E(x˜2|x˜ ≤ −
√
µ2 + σ2)
= µ2 + σ2 −E(x˜2|x˜ ≤ −
√
µ2 + σ2) < 0,
and we obtain (y˜, x˜) /∈ F1.
Our results indicate that although positive covariance between x˜ and y˜ cannot guarantee
first-order risk aversion, expectation dependence can. Therefore, we may rephrase the question
about the participation puzzle and background risk as whether the expectation dependence of
the stock market with the background risk of nonstockholders is high enough to explain the low
participation in the stock market. Our contribution suggests that new empirical tests based
on expectation dependence between stock market risk and background risk exposure should be
developed.
6.4 Naive diversified portfolio model
The naive portfolio diversification rule is defined as one in which a fraction 1n of wealth is
allocated to each of the n assets available for investment at each rebalancing date. This rule is
easy to implement because it relies neither on estimation nor on optimization. Many investors
continue to use this simple rule to allocate their wealth across assets (see Benartzi and Thaler
2001; Huberman and Jiang 2006). DeMiguel et al. (2009) find that there is no single model that
consistently delivers a Sharpe ratio or a certainty-equivalent return that is higher than that of
the 1n portfolio rule.
Suppose that ε˜i is the return of stock i, ε˜ is the return of a portfolio consisting of 1n shares
of each stock, and picd( 1n) and pic(
1
n) are minimum risk premiums the investor will demand for
this portfolio. Proposition 6.1 shows that in the presence of a dependent background risk, the
investor can not always take advantage of the benefit of diversification, and the portfolio risk
will be eliminated only at the rate of 1n . If ε˜ and y˜ are positive (negative) expectation dependent
and the investor is correlation-averse, then the return of the naive diversified portfolio will be
higher (lower) than that corresponding to the portfolio’s expected return.
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6.5 Insurance supply
It is well known that the Law of Large Numbers is the actuarial basis of insurance pricing. By
pooling the risks of many policyholders, the insurer can take advantage of this Law. While Li
(2011) and Soon et al. (2011) investigate how dependent background risk affects demand for
insurance, Proposition 6.1 shows how dependent background risk affects insurance supply. If
1
n
∑n
i=1 ε˜i and y˜ are positive (negative) expectation dependent and the insurer is correlation-
averse, then the insurance premium will be higher (lower) than the actuarially fair premium.
Suppose that ε˜i is the loss for the insured i, and picd( 1n) and pic(
1
n) are the risk premiums of
the insurance company for the individual loss ε˜i. Proposition 6.1 implies that in the presence
of a dependent background risk, the insurer cannot always take advantage of the benefit of
diversification because the insurance risk will be eliminated only at the rate of 1n .
6.6 Other examples
We now discuss our result in relation with two other examples. Suppose that ε˜i is the default risk
of borrower i, and picd( 1n) and pic(
1
n) are the yield spreads charged by the banker. Proposition 6.1
shows that if ε˜ and y˜ are positive (negative) expectation dependent and the banker is correlation-
averse, then the yield spreads will be higher (lower) than that corresponding to the expected
loss of default risk.
It is believed that the lottery business is rather safe, because the Law of Large Numbers
entails that the average of the results from a large number of independent bets is quasi-constant
(with a very small variance). Suppose that ε˜i is the payment to a winner i, picd( 1n) and pic(
1
n) are
the average risk premiums for a lottery ticket. Proposition 6.1 shows that if ε˜ and y˜ are positive
(negative) expectation dependent and the lottery business is correlation-averse, then the price
for a lottery ticket must be higher (lower) than the expected payment of the lottery game.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we have extended the concept of first-order conditional risk aversion to first-order
conditional dependent risk aversion. We have shown that first-order conditional dependent
risk aversion can appear in the framework of the expected utility function hypothesis. Our
contribution provides insight into the difficulty of obtaining risk diversification in the presence
14
of a dependent background risk.
Recent studies show that background risk is more significant to explain portfolio choices.
The decision of a household to participate in the stock market is a function of many random
factors such as labor income, housing risk, private business income, and health. The availability
of health insurance is observed to increase the financial behavior of households (Goldman and
Maestas, 2007). More surprisingly, background risk becomes more significant than previously
documented to affect stock risk premiums and improve the performance of asset pricing models
(Palia et al., 2009): ”When all background risk variables shift one standard deviation from their
sample means, a household will decrease its likelihood to participate in the stock market by
twelve percent and reduce the proportion of stock holdings by four percent.” It seems that low
market participation is significantly related to the heterogeneity in household background risk
exposures.
These new results increase the previously documented magnitude of background risk effect
on stock market participation. Palia et al. (2009) estimate the standard deviations of the growth
rates of labor income, home equity, and private business income, as well as their correlations, to
measure the background risk effect. Using more general measures of risk dependence, such as
first-order expectation dependence, and even second-order expectation dependence, should in-
crease the effect of background risk on stock market participation for expected utility households
by allowing consideration of the first-order risk aversion effect.
8 Appendix: Proof of Lemma 4.4
From the definition of picd(k), we know that
Eu(w +Ekε˜− picd(k), y˜) = Eu(w + kε˜, y˜). (19)
Differentiating with respect to k yields
pi′cd(k) =
Eε˜Eu(w +Ekε˜− picd(k), y˜)− E[ε˜u1(w + kε˜, y˜)]
Eu1(w − picd(k), y˜) . (20)
Since picd(0) = 0, we have
pi′cd(0) =
Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜)−E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)]
Eu1(w, y˜)
. (21)
Note that
E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)] = Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜) + Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) (22)
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and the covariance can always be written as (see Cuadras (2002), Theorem 1)
Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
[F (ε, y)− Fε(ε)Fy(y)]dεdu1(w, y). (23)
Since we can always write (see e.g. Tesfatsion (1976), Lemma 1)∫ ∞
−∞
[Fε(ε|y˜ ≤ y)− Fε(ε)]dε = Eε˜− E(ε˜|y˜ ≤ y), (24)
hence, by straightforward manipulations, we find
Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
[F (ε, y)− Fε(ε)Fy(y)]u12(w0, y)dεdy (25)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
[Fε(ε|y˜ ≤ y)− Fε(ε)]dεFy(y)u12(w, y)dy
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[Eε˜− E(ε˜|y˜ ≤ y)]Fy(y)u12(w, y)dy (by (24))
=
∫ ∞
−∞
ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy.
Finally, we get
pi′cd(0) = −
∫∞
−∞ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
. (26)
Using a Taylor expansion of pi around k = 0, we obtain that
picd(k) = picd(0) + pi′cd(0)k +O(k
2) = −k
∫∞
−∞ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
+O(k2). (27)
Q.E.D.
9 Appendix: Proof of Lemma 5.2
From (22) and (24), we know that
E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)] = Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜) + Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) = Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜) +
∫ ∞
−∞
ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy.(28)
We now integrate the last term of (28) by parts repeatedly until we obtain:
Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) =
N∑
m=2
(−1)mu12(m−1)(w, d)mthED(x˜|d) (29)
+
∫ d
c
(−1)N+1u12(N)(w, y)N thED(x˜|y)dy, forN ≥ 2.
From (21), we have
pi′cd(0) (30)
=
Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜)−E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)]
Eu1(w, y˜)
−k
∑N
m=2(−1)mu12(m−1)(w, d)mthED(x˜|d) +
∫ d
c (−1)N+1u12(N)(w, y)N thED(x˜|y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
.
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Using a Taylor expansion of pi around k = 0, we obtain that
picd(k) (31)
= picd(0) + pi′cd(0)k +O(k
2)
= −k
∑N
m=2(−1)mu12(m−1)(w, d)mthED(x˜|d) +
∫ d
c (−1)N+1u12(N)(w, y)N thED(x˜|y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
+O(k2).
Q.E.D.
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